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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 20,856

vs.
J. RONALD WEST,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issue presented by this appeal is whether the District
Court erred in denying Defendant's Motion to Withdraw his Guilty
Plea.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant was originally charged by Information with
having committed the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child, a First
Degree Felony, alleged to have been committed on January 27,
1984, in violation of Section 76-5-404.1, Utah Criminal Code. The
Information was dated January 31, 1984, and was filed in the
Eighth Circuit Court, Provo Department on the same date. (R. 9).
On February 9, 1984, at the time set for Preliminary
Hearing, the Information was amended by interlineation to charge
Attempted Sexual Abuse of a Child, a Second Degree Felony.

On

that date the Defendant waived his right to Preliminary Hearing
and was bound over to the Fourth District Court to answer to the
charge. (R. 2).

On February 24, 1984, Defendant appeared before Judge George
E. Ballif and entered a plea of guilty to the Amended
Information. (R. 13,14).
Following a presentence investigation by the Department of
Adult Probation and Parole and two separate 45-day evaluations by
the Division of Corrections, the Defendant was returned to the
District Court for sentencing.

Defendant was sentenced on July

20, 1984, on the Second Degree Felony, to an indeterminate term
in the Utah State Prison of not less than one year nor more than
fifteen years. (R. 25,26).
On June 17, 1985, the Defendant signed a Motion to Withdraw
his Guilty Plea; the Motion apparently was filed in the Court on
July 2, 1985. (R. 41,42).

That Motion set forth two grounds for

withdrawal of the plea: (1) that the statute was changed to
provide a sentence materially less than the sentence to which
Defendant had been subjected; and (2) that the plea was
improperly induced by threats on the part of the County
Attorney's Office to seek minimum mandatory sentencing of three,
six or nine years in the State Prison if a guilty plea was not
entered on the Amended Information.
On June 25, 1985, the Utah County Attorney's Office filed a
Response to Defendant's Motion to Withdraw his plea. (R. 38-40).
The County Attorney's objection was (1) that the motion to
withdraw was untimely; (2) that the improper sentencing was being
considered in a habeas corpus proceeding in the Third District
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Court; and (3) that the plea was not improperly coerced.

The

County Attorney's Response doesf however, indicate that the law
was changed seven days before this Defendant's arraignment, and
well before sentencing.

The County Attorney's Office indicated

that even though sentencing as a Third Degree Felony may be
appropriate, a withdrawal of plea probably wouldn't help the
Defendant since he would then be subject to prosecution on the
Second Degree Felony.
The County Attorney's Response denies any coercion on their
part, but does admit that plea negotiations involved discussions
of minimum mandatory sentencing, which they deemed were even
available under the law as amended.
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Plea was denied on July 2,
1985. (R. 44). On August 23, 1985, Defendant appeared for
re-sentencing as a Third Degree Felony; the Commitment was signed
and filed on September 4, 1985. (R. 50,51).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS

GUILTY PLEA.
A.

A GUILTY PLEA MAY BE WITHDRAWN IF ENTERED AS A RESULT OF

FRAUD, DURESS, MISTAKE, OR IGNORANCE.
B.

DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS ENTERED UNDER A MISUNDERSTANDING OF

THE LAW.
C.

DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS INDUCED BY THREATS OF MINIMUM

MANDATORY PUNISHMENT.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS

GUILTY PLEA.
A.

A GUILTY PLEA MAY BE WITHDRAWN IF ENTERED AS A RESULT OF

FRAUD, DURESS, MISTAKE, OR IGNORANCE.
It is a well-established principle of law in Utah as well as
the rest of the country that withdrawal of a guilty plea lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court and that a
Defendant may not withdraw his guilty plea as a matter of right.
State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450 (Utah 1978) and State v. Hanson,
627 P.2d 53 (Utah 1981).

However, it is equally well-established

that a guilty plea which is entered as a result of fraud, duress,
mistake, or ignorance, should be allowed to be withdrawn.
"The court has an undoubted duty to guard against the
possiblity that an accused who is innocent of the crime
charged may be induced to plead guilty without sufficient
understanding of the nature of the charge or the
consequences of his plea....11 State v. Harris, 585 P. 2d at
452.
In the case of State v. Corvelo, 369 P.2d 903, 91 Ariz. 52
(Ariz. 1962), the Arizona court held that a defendant should be
allowed to withdraw a guilty plea where it appeared the plea was
made under some mistake or misapprehension.

In the case of State

v. Riley, 539 P.2d 526, 24 Ariz.App. 412 (Ariz. 1975), a
defendant entered a plea of guilty not realizing that the charge
carried minimum mandatory provisions.

In that case the defendant

had been advised by the Court and counsel that there were no
minimum mandatory provisions for the crime to which he was

pleading guilty.

The Arizona court held that the trial court

should have allowed withdrawal of the plea since it was not
entered knowingly. See also Hutton v. People, 398 P.2d 973 (Colo.
1965); Maes v. People, 396 P.2d 457 (Colo. 1964); State v. Byrd,
453 P.2d 22, 203 Kan. 45 (Kan. 1969); and Manning v. State, 374
P.2d 796 (Okla.Cr. 1962).
In the case of State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah
1983), the defendant plead guilty and recited to the Court the
facts upon which his plea was based.

That recitation of facts

indicated that defendant did not possess the mental element of
the crime of arson.

This Court held that the plea should have

been withdrawn because the defendant misunderstood the elements
of the crime.
B.

DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS ENTERED UNDER A MISUNDERSTANDING OF

THE LAW.
The record clearly indicates that Defendant was originally
charged with having committed a First Degree Felony.

Under Utah

law, First Degree Felonies carry prison terms of not less than
five years and which may be for life.

Other than cases involving

capital punishment and life sentences for homicide, a sentence of
five years to life is the most serious punishment one can receive
in Utah.

Alternatively, a Second Degree Felony in Utah carries a

prison term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years.

In terms of maximum punishments, a First Degree Felony is

roughly five times worse than a Second Degree Felony. At the time
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this Defendant appeared for arraignment, all participants
believed that Defendant's alternatives were to stand trial for
the First Degree Felony or plead guilty to the significantly
milder Second Degree Felony.

Believing those to be his only

alternatives, Defendant chose to avoid the risk of possible
lifetime incarceration and chose to give up his constitutional
right to a jury by his peers by pleading guilty to the Second
Degree Felony.
The record is also clear that prior to entry of Defendant's
plea in this case, the legislature amended the statute under
which Defendant was originally charged to designate it a Second
Degree Felony. If Defendant had been charged according to the way
the law actually stood at the time of his arraignment, his
choices would have been to plead to the Second Degree Felony or
to stand trial on the Second Degree Felony.

Faced with those

alternatives, Defendant would have obviously opted to exercise
his constitutional rights.
In this case the Defendant decided to forego his right to
jury trial and plead guilty to the lesser charge because he
believed the alternative was possible lifetime incarceration. The
County Attorney's response to Defendant's Motion to Withdraw his
plea indicates that none of the attorneys nor the Court were
aware the legislature had amended the statute under which this
Defendant was charged.

It further indicated that at the time

Defendant was initially sentenced, everyone was aware the law had
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been changed.

It is clear that the Defendant should have been

allowed to withdraw his plea.
In the case of Trenary v. State, 453 So.2d 1132 (Fla.App.D2
1984) a defendant entered a guilty plea in reliance upon his
attorney's advice. The attorney's advice was based upon an honest
mistake or misunderstanding as to what the law provided and the
Court held the defendant should have been allowed to withdraw his
plea.
In the case of Britt v. State, 352 So.2d 148 (Fla.App.D2
1977), the Florida Court stated as follows:
"Appellant argues the trial judge should have granted his
motion to set aside his pleas because he did not enter into
those pleas volutarily because both his own court-appointed
counsel and the court led him to believe the maximum
sentence was fifteen rather than five years.
It is clear from the facts of this case that there was
a general misapprehension among all the parties involved as
to the length of the time which appellant could be
imprisoned. Even the trial court believed that appellant
could receive a fifteen year sentence when, in fact, under
Sections 810.05 and 775.002(5), Florida Statutes (1973),
appellant could only receive a five-year sentence.
A person induced to give up his right to a trial by a
misapprehension of circumstances surrounding his plea is
entitled to vacation of any judgment and sentence resulting
from such a plea." 352 So.2d at 149.
In the later case of Forbert v. State, 437 So.2d 1079 (Fla.
1983), a defendant had entered a plea of guilty with the
understanding that the sentence entered, five years in prison
followed by three years on probation, was a legal sentence.

This

type of split sentence was later determined by the Florida
Supreme Court to be illegal and the trial court resentenced the
defendant to eight years in prison.
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That court stated:

"Hence when a defendant pleads guilty with the understanding
that the sentence he or she receives in exchange is legal,
when in fact the sentence is not legal, the defendant should
be given the opportunity to withdraw the plea when later
challenging the legality of the sentence." 437 So.2d at
1081.
The case before the Court appears to be very similar to the
cases recently decided in Florida.

This Defendant entered a plea

of guilty to a Second Degree Felony rather than risking
conviction on a First Degree Felony.

At the time the plea was

entered, the original charge had been amended by the legislature
and was now only a Second Degree Felony itself. Defendant gave up
his constitutional rights in order to avoid the risk of possible
lifetime incarceration, when that possibility did not, in fact,
exist.

Defendant's plea was entered under a complete

misunderstanding or misapprehension regarding his alternatives
and the trial court erred in denying Defendant's Motion to
Withdraw his Guilty Plea.
C.

DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS INDUCED BY THREATS OF MINIMUM

MANDATORY PUNISHMENT.
In this matter, the Defendant has repeatedly asserted that
his guilty plea was induced through the prosecution's threats of
minimum mandatory sentencing.

The crime with which Defendant was

originally charged did not contain provision for minimum
mandatory sentencing.

There was provision, however, that under

certain aggravating circumstances, the Court could impose minimum
mandatory sentences.
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In the County Attorney's response to Defendant's Motion to
Withdraw his Plea, the prosecutor admitted that "plea
negotiations did involve discussions of minimum mandatory
sentencing."

The County Attorney's office denied that there had

been anything improper with those discussions because the office
deemed those punishments to be available at the time.

Whether

those punishments were available at the time, Defendant has
asserted that he was under the impression that if he did not
plead guilty to the Second Degree Felony, the prosecutor intended
to seek minimum mandatory sentencing.
Whether the prosecutor's use of minimum mandatory sentencing
was a threat or improper inducement, the fact remains that there
had been discussion of minimum mandatory sentencing and
subsequently, Defendant chose to plead guilty to a crime which
avoided minimum mandatory sentencing.

At this point the Court

could safely assume that the possibility of minimum mandatory
sentencing, if Defendant did not accept the offered plea bargain,
was part of Defendant's inducement to enter a plea.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant in this case entered a plea of guilty to a
Second Degree Felony, believing that the alternative was a First
Degree Felony with its possible lifetime incarceration. Defendant
further believed that the prosecutor intended to seek minimum
mandatory sentencing if a guilty plea was not entered on the
Second Degree Felony.

The Defendant' plea was entered under a
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misunderstanding regarding the law which was in effect at the
time of the plea and under threat of minimum mandatory sentencing
if a plea of guilty was not entered.

Under either theory, the

Defendant should have been allowed to withdraw his plea.

The

Courtfs denial of Defendant's Motion was an abuse of discretion
and the matter should be remanded to the District Court with
instructions to allow Defendant to withdraw his plea and proceed
to trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted this ^Qfa

day of February, 1986.

KENT 0. WILLIS
Attorney for Defendant
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